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Abstract
We study the e¤ect of a Program, aimed at nancing high qual-
ity researchers to integrate them into the Spanish scientic system,
on the relative ex post performance of the researchers awarded. We
assess the e¤ect of the contract status on the scientic productivity
of applicants, in the four-year period after application. Both the con-
ditional regression and the matching results show that the contract
status has no e¤ect on the average number of published contributions,
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1 Introduction
This paper studies if the Ramon y Cajal (R&C) contract has a di¤erential
impact on the research output of the researchers awarded with Ramon y Cajal
contracts years later. For such purpose, we exploit data on applications in
several calls of the Program, as well as individual and curricular information
of the applicants.
The Ramon y Cajal Program was introduced in 2001 by the Spanish
Government. It is an ambitious publicly funded program aimed at providing
career paths to high-quality researchers and to integrate them within the
national scientic system. It was created in the general context of a lack of
R&D personnel in Spain and with Spanish Universities hiring policies being
called into question.
The researchers hired under the program benetted from a well-dened
career path, with a 5-year contract in a Spanish research centers access to
research grants, and the possibility to join permanent research positions at
the end of the contract (see Sanz Menéndez et al, 2002; Sanz Menéndez,
2003).
The selection procedure was centralized in an evaluation agency, Agencia
Nacional de Evaluación y Prospectiva (ANEP). This agency, appointed by
the Government, appraised all eligible applicants based on predetermined
rigorous and objective evaluation criteria based mainly on the candidates
scientic record. For this purpose, 24 evaluation committees of national
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and international experts, one for each research eld, were constituted by
the evaluation agency.1 Four years after each call, the performance of each
granted applicant during the contractual period was evaluated. A positive
evaluation implies the possibility to receive a new contract that facilitated
her access to a tenured contract in the research center.
We conrm that the assessment process was based on the applicants
research C.V. and that the available curricular information has mattered
for the grading that the assessment committees gave to each applicant. In
order to assess the e¤ectiveness of the Program, we analyze the impact of the
contract status on researchersscientic productivity four years after the call.
To circumvent potential selection biases due to di¤erences between successful
and unsuccessful applicants, we control for observed curricular characteristics
that yield a similar probability of contract at the time of the call. Our main
results show that the contract had no impact on the number of published
contributions, but had a positive e¤ect on the quality of contributions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce
the main data set of application, and the complementary data set on the
applicantscurricular information and preliminary results. In section 3, we
evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the Program in the scientic productivity of
successful applicants. In section 4, we summarize the major results and
discuss their policy implications, and conclude.
1A list of the 24 research areas is shown in the Appendix, Table A1.
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2 Data and preliminary evidence
The main data set, provided by the Dirección General de Investigación of
the Spanish Ministry of Education, records all applications in the rst seven
calls of the program, from 2001 to 2007. We excluded observations with
missing values for individual characteristics, which represent less than one
percent of all observations. Each applicant information includes her research
area, the institution and year when she earn her PhD, country of residence
and nationality, as well as the score received in the assessment process and
whether she was granted a contract.
In Table 1, we provide the distribution of all the applications and the
distribution of successful applications in Table 1. The distribution is not
uniform in time, as it is not the number of contracts o¤ered, which decreased
substantially since 2003. In addition, since 2004, eligibility was restricted to
earning the PhD in the last 10 years, and a minimum 2-years stay in center
di¤erent than that in which the Ph.D. was obtained.
We observe that applications are dominated by men. The research areas
of Biology, Chemistry and Medicine cope about 60% of the applications.
It must be noted that the gender distribution is strongly unequal across
research areas. Physics and Engineering are strongly dominated by men,
amount 80% of applicants. In Chemistry and Business, men represent about
60%. However, in Social Sciences and in Biology, the proportion of men is
around 52%. Medicine is dominated by women, with 54% of applications.
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With respect to time elapsed since the PhD, the majority of applicants earned
their Ph.D. within 3 to 6 years before the call.
The curricular information has been collected from a complementary data
source, the free net resource Publish or Perish (Harzing, 2007). Publish or
Perish retrieves academic contributions by author using the Google Scholar
database, which provides the title, the source, the year and the authors of
the contribution. Google Scholar is generally praised for its speed (Bosman
et al., 2006) and its high correlation with alternative bibliometric sources
(See Harzing, 2012, and Harzing and van der Wal, 2011, for a comparison
of citation analysis using di¤erent data sources). Whenever the contribution
was published in a scientic journal, the journal information is also reported.
For each applicant, we can then measure her number of distinct contributions
and, among these, the number of published papers. In order to weight the
quality of each contribution, we use the Journal of Citation Reports (JCR),
which provides the impact factors of the international journals listed in its
database. The impact factor of a journal is calculated on the basis of the
average number of citations attained by the contributions published in that
journal. We use the JCR impact factors to measure both the quality of
each candidate, as well as the quality of the center where each candidate
earned her PhD, dened as the average number of citations to all the works
published in JCR journals by all the researchers a¢ liated to the center. The
curricular information is updated up to 2008.
We concentrate on the rst calls, until 2003, as we have to exploit curricu-
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lar information several years after the call. Data on 2001 is also disregarded,
given the special characteristics of the rst call, which might harden the com-
parability of applications with subsequent calls (Alonso-Borrego et al, 2013).
Moreover, we have restricted the sample, for the sake of comparability, to
applicants who earned a PhD within the last ten years.2 Our nal sample,
therefore, contains 4,967 applicants between 2002 and 2003.
We use three measures of scientic quality of each applicant: her number
of contributions listed in the JCR database, the average impact factor of her
JCR publications, and the maximum impact factor among the JCR journals
in which she has published. The two impact factor measures are based on
the corresponding impact of the journal in which she has published each
contribution.
In Table 2 we summarize the curricular information of applicants by con-
tract status. Besides, we break down the sample by applicantscharacteris-
tics: gender, research area, and time elapsed since the PhD. For all categories
considered, we observe that, at the time of the call, granted researchers have,
on average, more published contributions and a higher scientic impact (ei-
ther average or maximum impact) than non-granted researchers. Neverthe-
less, given the high standard deviations, most di¤erences are not signicant.
We also nd that the three measures of scientic quality di¤er substantially
by area, reecting di¤erences in the usual number of papers and citations
among areas.
2Actually, this condition was established by the Program since 2004.
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To ascertain the factors that are relevant for the committeesassessment
of applicants, we consider a conditional analysis of the applicantsscores on
their individual and curricular characteristics. The OLS estimation results
are shown in Table 3. The rst column reports the full sample regression of
score on applicants characteristics, using qualitative variables to allow for
di¤erences among areas. We also report separate estimations for each of the
Publish or Perish areas.3 In all the estimates, both for the full sample and by
areas, a high proportion of the variance of score is explained. In most areas,
scientic quality of applicants prove to be determinant in the committees
assessments, and in general the quality of contributions matters more than
its quantity. Furthermore, the quality of the center in which the Ph.D. was
obtained is also a relevant factor in Physics, Economics and Humanities. In
the case of Economics and Humanities, the curricular variables are non signif-
icant. The small sample size in Economics lead to very imprecise estimated
coe¢ cients. This is not the case, though, of Humanities, what suggests that
the committees assessment relies on di¤erent criteria. In Physics, the num-
ber of JCR papers appears more relevant than the quality of contributions.
It is also interesting that PhD tenure has an inverted-U e¤ect on applicants
score in most areas. Given that we are also controlling for scientic quality,
this variable, together with the quality of the PhD center, might be capturing
other unobserved quality features. For instance: papers on under revision;
3A list of the 7 areas reported in Publish or Perish is shown in the Appendix, Table
A2.
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forthcoming papers (but not published at the year of the call); the quality of
the research agenda of the candidate, etc.
Among the individual characteristics, we nd a positive and signicant
gender e¤ect in favor of men, which ranges between 3 and 5 percentage points.
This result suggests that men are slightly better graded than women with
similar scientic quality, pointing out a certain degree of gender discrimina-
tion. Also, we have included the quality of the PhD institution, measured
by the cumulated impact of the contributions listed in the JCR of its faculty
members, which has a positive e¤ect, and it is signicant in several areas.
3 The performance of Ramon y Cajal researchers
We are mostly intrigued about the impact of the contract status on the
ex-post performance of researchers. For that purpose, we consider the sci-
entic outputs of applicants in the four years after the call. Given the data
constrains, we consider the time horizon chosen to be su¢ cient to test the po-
tential inuence of the contract. It is, though, consistent with the usual time
span for the tenure decision taken by the research centers. Moreover, such
time span seems to be in coherence with the maximum time length needed
to undertake a peer-reviewed publication process of scientic contributions.
Our relevant policy variable is a binary variable indicating whether the
individual was granted a Ramón y Cajal contract, that we denote as Di,
which takes on value 1 if the researcher i has been granted a contract and
zero otherwise. Our concern is whether the contract status a¤ects the re-
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seachers productivity outcome Yi in the four-year period after the call. We
undertake the analysis using three alternative outcomes variables, measuring
scientic performance of researchers. These variables are the number of con-
tributions published in journals listed in the JCR, the average impact of such
contributions, and the maximum impact factor among the JCR journals in
which she has published.
As it is well known, the ideal evaluation problem, for a given researcher,
consists on comparing her two potential outcomes depending on whether she
had and she had not a contract, denoted as Y0i and Y1i, respectively. If both
counterfactual outcomes were observed for researcher i, the impact of the
contract for such researcher would simply be (Y1i   Y0i), and we then could
calculate the average treatment e¤ect, i.e., the average impact of the contract
computing the sample counterpart of E (Y1i   Y0i), where E (:) denotes the
mean operator (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
Since having or not having a contract are mutually exclusive, for each
researcher we just observe either Di = 1 or Di = 0, and therefore we just
observe her outcome under one of the two situations, i.e.,
Yi = DiY1i + (1 D1)Y0i. (1)
If we consider the regression model
Yi = + Di + ui, (2)
where the parameter  is the treatment e¤ect, and ui is an error term cap-
turing unobserved individual di¤erences in scientic productivity. However,
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given that for each researcher we just observe one potential outcome, the
regression based on observed outcomes would provide the mean di¤erences
in outcomes between researchers granted with a contract and researchers
without a contract,
E (YijDi = 1)  E (YijDi = 0) . (3)
which, unless contract status were purely random, will di¤er from . We
know, though, that contract status depends on researcherscharacteristics.
In other words, in the regression above, there is a selection bias, so that
E (uijDi) 6= 0. Essentially, those researchers with a contract are likely to be
more productive than researchers without a contract anyway.
As a consequence, if we consider the naive regression (1) to estimate 
using our sample of applicants by OLS, regressing the observed outcome Yi on
Di, the resulting naive estimate of  will be contaminated by selection bias,
so we would exacerbate the impact of the contract. Yet if we have available
additional individual information Xi that determines treatment status, then
the potential outcomes might be mean-independent of Di, conditional on
Xi.We denote it as conditional mean-indepence. In such a case, we could
consider the augmented specication
Yi = + Di + 
0Xi + ui, (4)
If conditional on such additional information, average potential outcomes are
independent of the treatment status, then E (uijDi;Xi) = 0 holds. Conse-
quently, OLS estimation of (4) will yield a consistent estimate of the impact
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of the contract. The information contained in Xi consists of the observed
variables at the time of the call: the researcher curricular information, the
time elapsed since the researcher earner her PhD, the quality of her PhD in-
stitution, snd the researchers gender. The validity of the regression estimate
of the causal e¤ect in (4) relies on absence of unobserved di¤erences between
granted and non-granted researchers that a¤ect their potential outcomes.
Alternatively, we can consider matching estimators of the impact of the
contract on those researchers who actually obtained a contract, i.e., the av-
erage treatment e¤ect on the treated. The idea is to compare the outcomes
of granted researchers with the outcomes of selected non-granted researchers
that are similar to the rst ones except for their contract status. The criterion
to match each granted researchers with a non-granted researcher will be the
propensity score, i.e., the probability of being granted a contract, conditional
on the applicants characteristics at the time of the call. The validity of our
propensity score matching relies on the validity of the Conditional Indepen-
dence assumption (CIA), i.e., the selection of researchers in the treatment
group (granted researchers) or in the control group (non granted researchers)
is only based on observables (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). In other words,
once we control for these observables (CV quality and other individual char-
acteristics at the time of the call), being granted or not cannot depend on
output. Taking into account that our performance measure consists of the
CV quality four years after the call, we are quite condent that the CIA
holds.
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In Table 4, we report OLS linear regression estimates for the full sample
of applicants for the three alternative outcomes. For the sake of camparison,
we report the naive unconditional estimates of the impact of the contract
corresponding to eq. (1), and the conditional estimations of the impact of
the contract based on (4). In all estimations we control for di¤erences across
scientic areas using a set of area binary dummies. For any of the out-
comes, the naive estimates yield a highly positive and signicant e¤ect of the
contract. It must be noted, though, that there are substantial di¤erences be-
tween researchers with and without contract that, on average, make granted
researchers more productive than non-granted researchers, so we expect un-
conditional estimates to be contaminated by a strongly positive selection
bias. This is conrmed by the conditional estimates of the impact of the
contract, which are much smaller in magnitude. In fact, we nd that, when
we control for researchercharacteristics at the time of the application, the
contract has no signicant e¤ect on the number of published contributions
in the four-year period after the call, so there are not di¤erences in quantity
by contract status. If we regard the inuence of the scientic contributions,
measured by either the average impact or the maximum inpact, we nd that
contract status entails signicantly positive di¤erences in quality. This re-
sults suggest that researchers keep producing scientic output at a similar
pace irrespective of their contract status, but researchers with a contract
achieve a higher scientic inuence.
When we disaggregate by areas, we get similar results than with the full
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sample. The naive estimates of the impact of the contract, reported in Ta-
ble 5, are positive and signicant, both for quantity and quality of scientic
contributions, in most of the areas. When we condition on researcherschar-
acteristics, there are no longer di¤erences in the quantity of scientic contri-
butions. But some di¤erences across areas arise in the scientic quality. In
particular, in the case of Biology, Chemistry and Physics, we nd a positive
e¤ect of the contract on the average impact and the maximum impact. The
e¤ects are not signicant for Economics, Engineering and Humanities. In the
case of Economics, the sample size is very small. In the case of Engineering
and Humanities, there can exist di¤erences in the scientic standards that
rule these disciplines. The development of patents is particularly relevant in
many Engineering elds, as much as the published contributions in scientic
journals.
We have a substantially di¤erent result for Medicine, as the contract has
a negative e¤ect on the scientic impact, which is signicant when we con-
sider maximum impact. This is an intriguing result, which deserves further
investigation. It suggests that non-granted researchers keep their research
career in an environment that favors their scientic impact. Issues like the
availability and quality of laboratories and other available resources can be
behind this.
The estimation results for the propensity score matching estimates are
shown in Table 7. Granted applicants are then matched with non-granted
applicants who are similar in their propensity score. To check whether results
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might be inuenced by the similaritycriterion, we consider three alterna-
tive criteria: kernel, nearest neighbor and stratication. We have used the
Stata procedure written by Becker and Ichino (2002). The variables used
to estimate the probability of being granted a contract are the same that
we have used as covariates in the conditional regression estimates.4 Essen-
tially, alternative matching criteria do not di¤er except for the signicance
of the estimated e¤ects: kernel and stratication methods yield very similar
results, and nearest neighbor method is typically less precise. Qualitatively,
the results resemble the obtained for the conditional regression estimates.
Again, the contract status does not a¤ect the quantity of publications, and
the contract has a positive impact in our two measures of scientic quality
for Biology, Chemistry and Physics areas. Interestingly, contract status for
Medicine does not yield signicant di¤erences in scientic quality.
In general, the results suggest that, for researchers who are comparable in
their ex ante characteristics, the contract status does not yield di¤erences in
the number of scientic contributions four years after the call. In addition,
researchers with a Ramón y Cajal contract show, on average, a scientic
impact four years after the call which higher than for comparable researchers
without a contract. This di¤erence is, indeed, signicant for several areas.
We nd, though, an exception in the case of Medicine.
4The estimated propensity score yields predicted probabilities of being granted a con-
tract that hold the balancing property. Such property establishes that, conditioning on the
propensity score, the distribution of the explanatory variables is not di¤erent for granted
and not granted researchers.
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4 Conclusions
The Ramón y Cajal Program was created to ameliorate the shortage of funds
for research personnel and to improve the quality of the Spanish R&D system.
For that purpose, the program provided funding to recruit quality researchers
and to provide them an entry point into the R&D system. The Program was
successful in selecting high quality researchers, the selection being based on
curricular merits.
We have analyzed the e¤ect of the program on the productivity of the
selected researchers and compare them with scholars with similar curricu-
lar characteristics that were not awarded with a Ramon y Cajal contract.
We have undertaken two alternative approaches to estimate the causal ef-
fect of the contract: conditional regression and propensity score matching
procedures. Overall, the results provided by both methods are alike.
We nd that the selection process was based on the applicants research
curriculum and that the researchers maintain, once in the Program, a quanti-
tative level of scientic production comparable with similar researchers that
were marginally rejected in the selection process. When we consider the sci-
entic impact of the researchers, we nd it is at least as high as that for
non-granted researchers, and it is signicantly higher in several areas.
In some areas for which we do not nd a signicant e¤ect of the contract,
particularly Engineering and Humanities, there can exist di¤erent scientic
practices and standards. In such cases, our curricular measures can render
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insu¢ cient to characterize the research merits of the candidates. Also, we
nd a di¤erential result for Medicine. According to our conditional regres-
sion estimates, the contract has a negative causal e¤ect on scientic impact;
the matching estimator is also negative but signicant. This is an intriguing
result; further investigation would require additional data to ascertain where
those non-granted researchers that ex ante are comparable with granted re-
searchers have developed their research career in the years following the pro-
gram call.
Our results point out the success of the Program in increasing the sci-
entic impact of the Spanish system. Interestingly, the program does not
appear to have an e¤ect on the quantity of scientic papers produced, but
it has on the impact of the scientic contributions. This is an important
result, that supports that policies aimed at increasing the stock of human
resources in scientic research help to rise the international impact of the
Spanish R&D system.
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Table 1. Distribution of applicants and contracts
Percentages in each category
ALL
Applicantsa 6842
% Contractsb 2224
By Year (%) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Applicantsa 36.6 37.3 19.6 18.7 19.5 21.5
% Contractsb 19.8 27.5 22.1 18.9 18.5 16.4
By Gender (%) Fem. Male
Applicantsa 41.5 58.5
% Contractsb 28.1 36.2
By Area (%) Biol. Econ. Chem. Eng. Medic. Phys. Hum.
Applicantsa 35.6 2.4 15.8 11.5 12.2 9.0 13.5
% Contractsb 39.4 31.3 44.8 44.5 33.9 42.2 24.3
By Ph.D Up to 3-6 > 6
tenure (%) 2 yr. years years
Applicantsa 15.1 55.6 29.2
% Contractsb 28.2 33.4 32.1
aThe percentages of applicants by category add over 100%, since a fraction of them
apply in several years and/or in several areas.
bShare of granted researchers in the corresponding category.
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Table 2. Curricular information of applicants by contract status
Average Average Maximum
No. of papers Impact factor Impact factor
CONTRACT: Yes no Yes no Yes no
All 2:5 1:6 1:8 1:0 2:4 1:2
(6:4) (5:9) (3:4) (2:0) (5:2) (3:2)
By Gender
Female 2:6 1:8 2:1 1:1 2:7 1:4
(6:6) (6:0) (3:1) (2:0) (5:1) (3:6)
Male 2:4 1:5 1:7 0:9 2:3 1:1
(6:3) (6:1) (3:7) (2:0) (5:4) (2:9)
By Research area
Biology 2:7 2:5 2:4 1:4 3:1 1:8
(6:3) (8:5) (4:2) (2:2) (5:7) (4:1)
Economics 1:9 0:9 0:8 0:5 0:9 0:5
(1:9) (3:6) (0:9) (1:4) (1:0) (1:5)
Chemistry 3:0 1:7 1:7 1:0 2:4 1:2
(5:2) (3:9) (2:5) (1:5) (4:1) (2:3)
Engineering 0:9 0:5 0:5 0:2 0:4 0:2
(2:6) (1:5) (1:5) (0:4) (1:0) (0:4)
Medicine 4:7 2:6 2:7 1:8 4:2 2:1
(9:7) (6:4) (4:0) (2:9) (8:0) (4:3)
Physics 2:3 0:8 1:9 0:9 2:1 1:0
(9:6) (2:1) (3:0) (2:3) (3:7) (2:5)
Humanities 0:5 0:2 0:8 0:2 1:2 0:2
(1:4) (0:9) (2:9) (0:6) (6:0) (0:7)
By Ph.D. tenure
Up to 2 years 0:9 0:6 1:2 0:6 1:3 0:6
(2:2) (2:3) (3:2) (1:7) (3:5) (2:2)
3-6 years 2:1 1:4 2:0 1:0 2:7 1:3
(4:1) (5:0) (3:4) (2:1) (5:5) (3:2)
More than 6 years 3:6 2:7 1:9 1:3 2:7 1:6
(9:6) (8:7) (3:6) (2:2) (5:7) (4:0)
Standard deviation in parentheses below the sample mean of each category.
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Table 3. Assessment of candidates
Dependent variable: Score
By Area
ALL(1) Biol. Econ. Chem. Eng. Medic. Phys. Hum.
Constant 58:47x 49:68x 56:72x 46:29x 53:83x 54:92x 68:25x 53:82x
(1:56) (2:28) (7:52) (3:67) (3:88) (3:86) (4:36) (3:37)
# Papers 0:02  0:01 1:20 0:06 1:06y  0:04 0:11 1:21
(0:04) (0:05) (1:30) (0:21) (0:52) (0:12) (0:06) (1:45)
Avg. IF 0:68x 0:92x  3:06 1:69x  1:84 0:22 0:15 0:90
(0:21) (0:31) (7:40) (0:63) (0:97) (0:22) (1:44) (1:96)
Max. IF 0:17  0:14 2:56 0:23 5:75x 0:33y 0:62 0:06
(0:11) (0:18) (5:87) (0:34) (2:08) (0:14) (1:00) (0:69)
Gender 3:54x 4:23x  0:93 5:06x 5:20y 2:96y  0:09 4:34y
(0:60) (0:89) (5:19) (1:85) (2:55) (1:28) (2:13) (1:89)
PhD tenure 1:46x 1:57x  1:71 2:40x 0:86 1:58x 1:36y 2:33x
(0:18) (0:34) (1:40) (0:44) (0:50) (0:60) (0:54) (0:40)
PhD tenure2  0:05x  0:05y 0:10  0:08x  0:03  0:09x  0:06y  0:07x
(0:01) (0:02) (0:05) (0:02) (0:02) (0:03) (0:03) (0:01)
PhD center 0:54x 0:61x 0:64 0:53y 0:66x 0:52 0:13 0:10
quality (0:09) (0:17) (0:41) (0:26) (0:22) (0:29) (0:29) (0:24)
# obs. 4; 967 1; 995 104 694 394 730 434 616
R2 0:94 0:94 0:89 0:92 0:92 0:96 0:95 0:91
Binary dummies for esearch areas (DGI) included in the full sample regression.
Gender takes on value 1 if male and 0 otherwise. Robust standard error in parentheses.
;y ;xSignicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Applicants scientic output 4 years after the call.
OLS estimates. Full sample
Outcome variable No. of papers Avg. Impact Max. Impact
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Contract 0:785x 0:050 0:637x 0:223x 0:849x 0:286y
(0:225) (0:140) (0:096) (0:079) (0:134) (0:121)
No. of papers (t-4) 0:940x 0:036x 0:066x
(0:048) (0:011) (0:019)
Average IF (t-4)  0:073 0:393x 0:449x
(0:086) (0:094) (0:124)
Maximum IF (t-4) 0:042 0:058 0:091
(0:069) (0:030) (0:058)
Gender 0:206  0:040 0:022
(0:117) (0:071) (0:103)
PhD tenure  0:241x  0:048x  0:071x
(0:033) (0:016) (0:026)
PhD tenure2 0:006x  0:002y 0:002
(0:001) (0:001) (0:001)
PhD center quality  0:028y  0:004  0:002
(0:013) (0:009) (0:014)
Number of observations 3; 165
R2 0:09 0:80 0:22 0:51 0:19 0:44
Dummies for research areas and residence included in multiple regressions.
Gender takes on value 1 if male and 0 otherwise. Robust standard error in parentheses.
;y ;xSignicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
.
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Table 5. Applicants scientic output 4 years after the call.
Unconditional OLS estimates. By research areas.
Outcome variable: Number of papers
Biol. Econ. Chem. Eng. Medic. Phys. Hum.
Contract 0:039x 1:005 1:188 0:463y 2:376y 1:285 0:113
(0:402) (0:650) (0:494) (0:230) (1:125) (0:676) (0:216)
R2 0:09 0:17 0:15 0:15 0:15 0:09 0:06
Outcome variable: Average Impact
Contract 0:689x 0:116 0:544y 0:195x 0:614 1:378x 0:195
(0:182) (0:204) (0:151) (0:063) (0:319) (0:494) (0:142)
R2 0:28 0:26 0:37 0:23 0:34 0:16 0:08
Outcome variable: Maximum Impact
Contract 0:960x 0179 0:826x 0:263x 0:705 1:686x 0:332
(0:258) (0:279) (0:210) (0:079) (0:480) (0:603) (0:224)
R2 0:24 0:22 0:33 0:22 0:26 0:16 0:07
Obs. 1; 308 90 552 416 448 329 494
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
;y ;xSignicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Applicants scientic output 4 years after the call.
Conditional OLS estimates. By research areas.
Outcome variable: Number of papers
Biol. Econ. Chem. Eng. Medic. Phys. Hum.
Contract  0:042  0:024 0:107 0:167  0:115 0:241  0:231
(0:229) (0:596) (0:431) (0:234) (0:518) (0:252) (0:156)
R2 0:85 0:86 0:63 0:50 0:85 0:88 0:46
Outcome variable: Average Impact
Contract 0:300y  0:240 0:314y 0:099  0:130 1:122y  0:037
(0:145) (0:244) (0:146) (0:076) (0:223) (0:495) (0:089)
R2 0:52 0:69 0:59 0:47 0:68 0:38 0:40
Outcome variable: Maximum Impact
Contract 0:501y  0:313 0:528y 0:154  0:705 1:218y  0:065
(0:232) (0:390) (0:217) (0:096) (0:379) (0:537) (0:111)
R2 0:44 0:57 0:52 0:66 0:56 0:35 0:49
Obs. 1; 189 81 464 304 417 269 441
Covariates include dummies for research areas and residence, gender
and PhD tenure, as well as curricular variables at the.time of the call.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
;y ;xSignicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. ATT Estimates of the impact of the contract
Propensity score matching estimates
Matching Outcome variable: Number of papers
Method All Biol. Econ. Chem. Eng. Medic. Phys. Hum.
kernel 0:168 0:232  0:283  0:024 0:479 0:673 1:075  0:112
(0:160) (0:223) (3:009) (0:786) (0:275) (1:334) (0:725) (0:365)
NN 0:291 0:283 0:143 0:310 0:217 0:026 1:188  0:237
(0:489) (0:609) (3:642) (1:186) (0:380) (2:002) (0:849) (0:503)
stratif. 0:031 0:277 1:320 0:248 0:316 0:919 0:855  0:103
(0:346) (0:343) (0:529) (0:845) (0:235) (1:645) (0:779) (0:224)
Outcome variable: Average Impact
kernel 0:382x 0:499x  0:328 0:320y 0:086 0:188 1:254y 0:154
(0:096) (0:183) (0:740) (0:148) (0:101) (0:310) (0:514) (0:140)
NN 0:306y 0:492y  0:447 0:291  0:041  0:140 0:920 0:172
(0:141) (0:247) (1:033) (0:213) (0:142) (0:414) (0:625) (0:173)
stratif. 0:351x 0:489y 0:057 0:279 0:111 0:232 0:892y 0:054
(0:115) (0:214) (0:236) (0:155) (0:069) (0:349) (0:445) (0:121)
Outcome variable: Maximum Impact
kernel 0:494x 0:774x  0:376 0:552y 0:156  0:270 1:262y 0:277
(0:133) (0:258) (1:199) (0:224) (0:118) (0:549) (0:522) (0:235)
NN 0:448y 0:845y  0:750 0:476 0:021  0:506 0:995 0:294
(0:209) (0:367) (1:582) (0:298) (0:172) (0:838) (0:714) (0:239)
stratif. 0:458x 0:742y 0:030 0:516y 0:171  0:200 0:880 0:096
(0:156) (0:311) (0:393) (0:211) (0:096) (0:570) (0:546) (0:151)
Propensity score covariates include curricular variables at the.time of the call, gender,
PhD tenure, and quality of the PhD center.
The three alternative matching criteria are kernel, NN (nearest neighbor) and stratication.
Bootstrap standard errors, based on 500 replications, in parentheses.
;y ;xSignicant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A1
Research areas (DGI)
Physics and Space Sciences
Earth Sciences
Materials Science and Technology
Chemistry
Chemical Technology
Plant and Animal Biology. Ecology
Agriculture
Livestock and Fishery
Food Science and Technology
Molecular and Cell Biology and Genetics
Physiology and Pharmacology
Medicine
Mechanical, Ship and Aeronautical Engineering
Electrical and Electronic Eng. and Robotics
Civil Engineering and Architecture
Mathematics
Computer Sciences
Information and Communication Technologies
Economics
Law
Social Sciences
Psychology and Education Sciences
Philology and Philosophy
History and Art
Table A2
Research areas (Publish or Perish)
Biology, Life Sciences, Environmental Science
Business, Administration, Finance, Economics
Chemistry and Materials Science
Engineering, Computer Science, Mathematics
Medicine, Pharmacology, Veterinary Science
Physics, Astronomy, Planetary Science
Social Sciences, Arts, Humanities
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